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Abstract. Systems simulation has been widely used in the last decades in order 
to analyze the impact of different scenarios in several areas, and its application 
to information systems in no exception. Analyzing information systems through 
simulation models is simultaneously much more affordable; it is required a 
smaller amount of resources and it is less disruptive with the real system. Since 
information systems are becoming a cornerstone for our society, a failure in 
these systems can have a huge impact. The theory of vulnerability identifies 
failures in which small damage can have disproportionate impact consequences 
in terms of the functionality of the whole system. This paper discusses the use 
of the theory of vulnerability in information system simulation. 
Keywords: Simulation, modeling, vulnerability, information systems, failure 
scenarios. 
1 Introduction 
Our world is a wonderful, huge and complex system. It is a system because it has a set 
of entities interacting with each other in order to achieve some purpose [1-4]. It is 
complex because it has many entities interacting with each other at the same time and 
some of these interactions may be hard to represent through analytical models. It is 
huge because it incorporates many others subsystems such as health, business, 
education, transportation, political, among others, which may also include many 
others subsystems (ex: the transportation networks has the railway system, airway 
system, etc) and so on.  
Simulation is used in many different contexts; its list of applications is wide 
because we can simulate any system in which it is possible to apply the concepts of 
simulation modeling [4]. Information systems (IS) are not an exception for 
applications of simulation. Di Domenica et al. [5] explained to the IS community how 
simulation models and their software realizations could be integrated with advanced 
IS and decision support systems tools [5].  
A proper simulation can increase the performance quality of a process by 
rationalizing resources, reducing time consumption, decreasing costs [6-8] and 
reducing time-to-market [8, 9], fundamental aspects in the actual worldwide 
economic situation. 
Our society is becoming totally dependent on information systems. For instance, 
today it is quite common that we entrust our banking information into the bank 
information system, however a breakdown or failure of these systems can have 
catastrophic consequences. IS reliability are more and more an area of interest on 
research and simulation about how a system can fail, and the identification of its 
impact consequences, contributes for a better understanding of that system [10, 11]. In 
this context, the theory of vulnerability can be extremely useful, as it is able to 
identify the vulnerable parts of a system, in which small damage can lead to 
disproportionate failure consequences [12]. The identification of the system’s 
vulnerabilities enables system reliability [12].  
This paper discusses how to apply the theory of vulnerability in the information 
systems context and highlights the inherent advantages. In section two, some 
important simulation concepts are presented, together with the presentation of 
simulation in information, followed by a brief description of the theory of 
vulnerability in section three. Then, the potential use of the theory of vulnerability in 
simulation is discussed and proposed in section four, and finally, section five draws 
some conclusions. 
2 Simulation in information systems 
There is still not a universal definition of simulation. Nevertheless, most of the 
existing definitions follow the same general concept that simulation is an imitation of 
a system [6, 13-16]. Systems imitation requires the construction of an artificial history 
based on the real system features [6, 14] that includes the system’s dynamics and its 
behavior over time. 
First of all, imitating a system requires a perfect understanding of it [7]. Putting 
“why” questions to comprehend how the system evolves and how the changes occur, 
allow predicting the impact of changes. By studying a system and constructing its 
simulation model will enable to explore new possibilities of achieving better 
performance without necessary committing resources acquisition [6, 7]. Simulation 
has revealed to be an excellent tool for the study of complex systems, whose 
analytical behavior modeling may be extremely complex.  
Simulation has been used in many different contexts; practically, there are no 
boundaries, and it can be applied to any kind of system that fits modeling concepts. 
Manufacturing systems (optimization of production lines and logistics), public 
systems (emergency vehicle dispatch and weather forecast), military systems (warfare 
scenarios and training), transportations systems (railway network and air 
transportation), building industry systems (water pipe network, structures and 
electrical network), enterprise systems (financial and other business transaction 
processes) and computer systems (computer performance, computer networks and 
computer games) are some examples of possible applications [1, 2, 4, 14, 15]. 
2.1 Simulation basic concepts 
The understanding of some based concepts like system, entity and resource is required 
in order to develop simulation models. 
A system is a cluster of interrelated entities working together to achieve the same 
specific goal [2, 4, 14]. Systems are influenced by their environment. They receive 
inputs that cause systems changes and affect produce results (outputs). These changes 
are represented by state variables (in simulation vocabulary) and they define the 
system state in a certain period of time. In other words, system state variables 
contains the necessary data which together describe the system state in a particular 
moment on the simulation time [2, 6]. It is imperative for the analyst to know very 
well the system in order to identify correctly the system state variables. 
An entity is an object or component that requires an explicit representation on the 
simulation model [6]. Clients and computers are examples of objects. Entities and 
their  relationships define the system behavior Entities cause changes in the system 
state [13]. Each entity has its own characteristics or attributes. Attributes are 
identified characteristics (or qualities) from an entity that are very important to 
understand the entity role in the simulation [4, 13]. 
A resource is an object (or may be an entity) that has limited capacity [13]. 
Essentially, resources exist to serve entities and they can be many things such as 
machines, computers, workers and cars even entities. On the other hand, they are not 
always available to serve because they have states and limits. 
2.2 Models 
A model is a simplified representation of a system [4]. Simulation is a complex 
mathematical model that can be classified in: static or dynamic, deterministic or 
stochastic and continuous or discrete. 
Static simulation models are used to represent systems only in a particular moment 
of time which means that time does not have an effect on the system [1, 2]. In 
contrast, in dynamic systems the time is fundamental because the system`s behavior is 
dependent of it [1, 2]. 
In deterministic or stochastic simulation models the main difference is related to 
the existence (or not) of probabilistic characteristics in the system [1]. When a system 
has probabilistic (i.e. random) components the model is stochastic, otherwise it is 
deterministic [2]. 
In a simulation model, it is analyzed how often the system`s state changes. In 
continuous simulation model, the system state changes continually over time, whereas 
in a discrete simulation model the system state only changes in some particular 
moments on time [2, 14]. 
2.3 Simulating information systems 
Simulation applications areas are almost unlimited and the imagination of the analyst 
seems to be the only barrier [1]. Every system that fits into general simulation 
concepts can be simulated. In IS, simulation has also an important role, like for 
instance, improving information workflow. 
In general, an IS has entities and resources interacting to each other in order to 
manipulate information. By analyzing a new or an already existent IS through a 
model, the analyst can perform studies without changing the real IS itself. Figure 1 
shows an example of a sales information system of a generic enterprise. 
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Fig. 1. Example of an enterprise information system 
In the example in Figure 1, entities can be, for instance, workers, resources can be 
machines, and the arrows represent the communication links and information 
workflows (number near the arrow). Orders arrive into the enterprise information 
system by email and they are treated by different enterprise departments. Each 
department works based on the delivered information, adding eventually additional 
data to the initial order information. In terms of workflow, information may face 
several many different problems. Some of them may be related to entities (ex: missing 
person), to resources (ex: machine failure), to external environment (ex: international 
trade policies) or to communication channel (ex: without network). These influences 
may affect workflow and information in many aspects like quality, integrity, security, 
speed, among others. These aspects may be an excellent starting point of a simulation 
study. 
Supposing that the study goal was to increase speed of order replies without adding 
new entities or resources, then some questions arise: could be simulation a good tool 
to answer this question? If yes, what would be the appropriated simulation model? If a 
system is too complex, then it is extremely difficult to model it through analytical 
methods and simulation may be a good alternative. In order to choose the appropriate 
model of a system, the analyst has to be aware of some relevant aspects such as the 
time influence, the probabilistic characteristics and the system behavior. 
In this example, the system evolves over time (firstly a received order is processed, 
secondly that order is transferred to the correct department, as so on), thus the 
simulation model should be dynamic. 
Information systems include human resources (entities) and this fact adds into the 
model an expressive degree of uncertainly. For instance, worker productivity varies 
and changes over time. There are many other situations in which the only way of 
considering this uncertainty is by a statistical analysis. In general, when a system 
includes human decisions there is uncertainty. 
The system’s state changes over time. For instance, when the IS gets an order then 
the system is in a busy state. Otherwise, if there is no order the system is in an idle 
state. These characteristics are typical of a discrete simulation model. 
Based on the above analysis, we may propose that the type of simulation that is 
adequate to use in this example is the discrete-event simulation (DES). On DES, only 
when the system is in action it is important to the study, because it is assumed that 
nothing occurs outside these times [17]. The above example highlights that 
information systems can often be simulated using DES. 
It should be possible to simulate IS aiming to answer one important question: what 
failures can cause major impact on the IS? The Theory of Vulnerability could help to 
answer to this question. 
3 The Theory of Vulnerability 
Traditionally, an analysis of demand and capacities has worked well for most of 
networked systems. However, with increasing complexity of systems and the 
changing nature of demands, that is no longer sufficient. There is a need to examine 
the impact of damage to a system. For this purpose, for structural systems a theory of 
vulnerability has been developed (see for example on [12, 18-21]). Meanwhile, recent 
research has lead to the application of the vulnerability concepts in several areas like 
for instance water pipe network systems (Figure 2) [22]. 
This is a theory of form and connectivity that is able to identify the vulnerable 
parts of a system. The concept of vulnerability is associated with the 
disproportionateness of the failure consequences in relation to the initial damage; thus 
a system is vulnerable when a small damage demand leads to a disproportionately 
large system failure. The action that may cause initial damage can be of any type 
including human error. These concepts are applicable to many systems [12]. 
 
 
 
  
a) Example of a WPN b) The hierarchical model c) The unzipping process 
Fig. 2. Example of application of the vulnerability theory in the water pipe networks. 
Source: [22]. 
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3.1 The basic theoretical concepts 
A key concept in the proposed approach is to consider a system as a set of interacting 
objects. The objects are arranged in layers and connected together in an appropriate 
form. At the lowest level, a graph model represents the system in terms of nodes and 
links (Figure 2.b). 
 
Clusters and rings. A cluster is a subset of the graph model in which the objects 
(links and joints) are in some sense more tightly connected to each other than to other 
objects outside of the cluster (Figure 2.b). A leaf cluster (or a primitive cluster) 
contains a single link and adjacent joints. A branch cluster is a cluster that contains 
more than one leaf clusters. A ring consists of two connected branch clusters or 
primitive clusters with the potential to allow the flow between two nodes. It can be an 
open ring or a closed ring depending upon whether the clusters are arranged in series 
or parallel, Figure 2.b. 
A reference cluster is the source of the system. Total failure of the system occurs 
when there is a completely separation from all the reference clusters. The root cluster 
contains the entire system including the reference clusters. 
 
Well formedness. The well formedness of a cluster is a measure of the quality of the 
form of the part of the system related to that cluster. Generally, it is related to (a) the 
properties of the links of the system, (b) the type of the joints of the system, (c) the 
configuration of the system gradients and (d) the connectivity of the network. Each 
type of system has a specific above factors. 
 
Nodal connectivity. The nodal connectivity (η) of a branch cluster measures the 
connection of a branch cluster with the rest of the system. In other words, it captures 
the existing alternative flow paths between that branch cluster and the rest of the 
system. It also represents the likelihood of that branch cluster forming rings with the 
branch clusters of the rest of the system. 
 
Deteriorating event. A deteriorating event causes an initial damage. It could be the 
result of any type of action which causes the loss of the capacity to flow to a node. 
Some of the possible actions are the collapse of the system either due to human error 
or design error and the degradation of flow quality, the latter being extremely 
important. An ordered sequence of deteriorating events forms a failure scenario of the 
system which decreases the performance of it. 
 
Damage demand. Damage demand (E) is a measure of the effort required to cause a 
deteriorating event in the system. 
 
Relative damage demand. Relative damage demand (Er) of a system failure scenario 
is the ratio of the damage demand (E) of a failure scenario to the maximum possible 
damage demand (Emax) of a failure scenario in which deteriorating events occur in 
every system primitive clusters. 
 
Separateness. Separateness (γr) is a measure of the failure consequence and it is 
calculated as the ratio of the loss in system well formedness of the deteriorated system 
to the well formedness of the intact system. Maximum separateness occurs when the 
system becomes disconnected from the reference cluster and that defines total failure. 
If the separateness of a failure scenario is equal to 1 then the system is unable to 
function. In contrast, if it is equal to 0 then the system is totally intact and it is able to 
work. 
 
Vulnerability index. The system vulnerability index (φ) is a measure of the 
vulnerability of a system. It is calculated as the ratio of the separateness (γr) to the 
relative damage demand (Er). It is a measure of the disproportionateness of the 
consequence (i.e. the separateness) to the damage. A large value of φ related to a 
certain failure scenario indicates that the system is highly vulnerable. The effort 
required to cause an initial damage and the resulting spread of damage may give 
guidance for the management of the system, for instance. 
3.2 Application procedure of the theory 
The application of the theory to a system consists of two main stages – a clustering 
process and an unzipping process. The clustering process results in a description of a 
hierarchical model of the system for use in the next stage. The unzipping process 
results in the identification of failure scenarios which are related to the vulnerable 
parts of the system. 
 
Clustering process. The clustering process consists of a progressive formation of 
system branch clusters that are tightly connected. It starts at the lowest level by only 
using primitive clusters (i.e. the links and the adjacent nodes) and finishes, at the 
highest level, by having the whole system including the reference clusters. It is a 
selective process that requires clustering criteria to decide the next system branch 
cluster to be formed at each level of definition. These clustering criteria have to be 
defined for each system type. 
 
Hierarchical model. A hierarchical model is an alternative representation of a system 
but one which is central to the vulnerability approach (Figure 2.b). However, the 
system elements (i.e. the joints and links) appear in this model according to the 
quality of the form of the system clusters resulting from the previously referred 
clustering process. The formation of a hierarchical model has to start from the bottom 
and then it moves up. New system branch clusters are formed during the clustering 
process and the respective primitive clusters used are clearly identified. 
Simultaneously, the system rings that represent these new system branch clusters and 
the clustering criteria used for the candidate selection are also shown. The part of the 
system that appears at the bottom of the hierarchical model has better form than the 
others parts appearing higher up in the hierarchy. This model is used during the next 
stage (i.e. the unzipping process) of the application of the theory. 
 
The unzipping process. The unzipping process uses the hierarchical model of a 
system as the basis to search for the vulnerable failure scenarios in the system (Figure 
2.c). The hierarchical model is unzipped from the top to the bottom focusing on all the 
existing system branch clusters. Each system branch is unzipped in turn by 
introducing deteriorating events until a system branch cluster or the whole system 
becomes totally inoperative. After every deteriorating event, the system branch cluster 
changes and, therefore, it becomes necessary to re-cluster and to define a 
corresponding new hierarchical model of the damaged system branch cluster. This 
indicates that the unzipping is an iterative process. An ordered sequence of 
deteriorating events resulting from this process defines a vulnerable failure scenario. 
For the guided search of failure scenarios, the unzipping criteria have also to be 
defined for each type of system. 
3.3 Failure scenarios 
Through the unzipping process, several failure scenarios of a system are identified. Of 
these, the following are important. Total failure scenario is the one where least effort 
is required for the whole system to become inoperative. Among the identified failure 
scenarios with separateness equal to 1, the total failure scenario is the one that has 
highest value of vulnerability index (φ). Maximum failure scenario is the one that 
results in maximum damage from the least effort. Among the failure scenarios found, 
the maximum failure scenario is the one that has the highest value of φ. The 
maximum failure scenario is related to the most vulnerable part of a system. 
Minimum failure scenario is related to the least well formed part of a system and, in 
general, corresponds to the last leaf cluster to be clustered in the clustering process. 
Minimum demand failure scenario is related to the weakest part of a system to suffer 
damage. It corresponds to the leaf cluster that has the smallest value of damage 
demand. An interesting failure scenario is the one in which the designer is specifically 
interested for local reasons such as sensitivity to particular usage. 
Knowing the vulnerable parts of a system is then possible to mitigate them and, 
consequently, to contribute to achieve a better robust system solution. The theory can 
be applied during the process of creating a new system or, alternatively, during the 
maintenance or management processes of existing systems. 
4 Potential use of the theory of vulnerability in simulation 
Simulation allows a better understanding of a system in terms of function and 
behavior over time. It also allows analyzing alternative actions in order to anticipate 
impact changes. The theory of vulnerability analyzes the impact of damage in a 
system focused on the disproportionateness failures consequences. Its main purpose is 
to help identifying weak links inherent of a system [12]. 
Simulation and theory of vulnerability have both the same main purpose: to study 
the system in order to improve its functionality. While simulation does not have a 
predefined study goal, vulnerability theory has a particular key point of study: to 
identify actions that produce large disproportionate consequences to the system. By 
having only one particular goal of study does not mean that it is simple to achieve 
because it may be interrelated with other aspects (ex: security, performance, 
maintenance, among others). Currently, this theory has been especially applied in the 
water pipe networks. In Agarwal [12] there is a first step to extrapolate some of the 
main theoretical concepts of the theory to different types of systems. Table 1 includes 
some of results based on that research work; it compares water pipe networks and 
organizations type systems. 
After the simulation concepts and the theory of vulnerability being introduced, 
using the example of Figure 1 and the information displayed in Table 1, it is evident 
that it is possible and useful to extrapolate the theory of vulnerability to the simulation 
of information system context. 
Is it possible to build a simulation model to imitate damage events? Simulation 
main concept is to imitate any system (that fit on simulation concepts) and the theory 
of vulnerability gives a goal to the simulation (points of failure). Both techniques 
share the same first step and perhaps the most important: understand the system 
behavior. More the analyst knows about the system better will be the study 
conclusions. After understand the system behavior, comes the system representation. 
In theory of vulnerability the system is represented through a graph model, i.e. in 
terms of nodes and links [21], and in simulation there is not a pattern form. After the 
representation of the system through graph model comes the theory specifications: 
clustering and unzipping process. In those processes simulation may represent an 
interesting tool, especially on introduction of deteriorating events in the unzipping 
process. To achieve study goals the theory already gives the failure analysis process. 
Table 1. Water pipe networks versus Information Systems 
System Water pipe networks Information Sytems 
Function (purpose) Carry water without much  
loss of pressure 
 Manipulate information 
Source External supply, reservoir Entities and Resources 
(need to exchange information) 
References Points of in-flow (out-flow  
not important) 
Every node may be a reference 
Damage event Link cut Communication failure between any  
two nodes 
Partial failure Some nodes do not get  
supply or sufficient  
pressure 
Some links failed but mission can still  
be achieved 
Total failure criteria No nodes can get supply of  
water 
Overall mission cannot be achieved 
 
After building the simulation model according to this theory, simulation may be 
performed several times (those necessary to take valid conclusions) to identify the 
range of failure injection. Then the analyst can identify and study the failures that 
would create disproportioned failures in the system. 
Figure 2 in section 3, briefly illustrates the application of the vulnerability theory in 
the water pipe networks (WPN) in which a water pipe network system made of four 
pipes (links) and four joints (nodes) is used as an example (Figure 2.a) [22]. The 
hierarchical model of the WPN resulted from the clustering process is shown in 
Figure 2.b. Meanwhile, the first step of the unzipping process is shown in Figure 2.c. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper were presented the basic concepts of simulation as well as a brief 
description of the theory of vulnerability. The concept of vulnerability is associated 
with the disproportionateness of the failure consequences, in other words, a system is 
vulnerable when a small damage demand leads to a disproportionately large system 
failure. Based on graph model, this theory represents the system in terms of nodes and 
links. This theory can be very useful in the context of information systems simulation. 
As further work it is purposed to explore and extend this theory to IS context which 
can help to target its vulnerability. 
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